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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-2721
_____________
JASON RIMEL,
Appellant
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 11-538)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 22, 2013
______________
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: March 28, 2013)
______________
OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
After the Social Security Administration denied him disability insurance benefits

(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI), Appellant Jason Rimel sought review of
the decision from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. The District Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s benefits and he filed
this timely appeal.
For substantially the same reasons that the District Court affirmed the denial of
benefits, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

I. BACKGROUND
Since we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the
essential facts.
Appellant, a high school graduate, was thirty-one years old at the onset of his
alleged disability. For approximately thirteen years prior to his alleged disability, he
worked as a package sorter for United Parcel Service (otherwise known as “UPS”). Due
to various symptoms related to depression and anxiety, Appellant quit his job in June
2005 and has felt too incapacitated to return to work ever since. In addition, Appellant
was diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and obsessive compulsive disorder, and
prescribed medication. After he stopped working, Appellant lived with his parents but
managed to carry on a semi-normal existence, helping with household chores, driving,
caring for his dog, lifting weights, hunting, drawing as a hobby, and occasionally
socializing with friends and girlfriends.
On January 14, 2007, Appellant applied for DIB and SSI from the Social Security
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Administration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Appellant
did not qualify as disabled under the Social Security Administration’s five-step rubric and
denied him DIB and SSI. Upon appellate administrative review, the ALJ’s decision was
vacated and remanded for further consideration, with specific instructions for the ALJ to
consider the opinion of Appellant’s treating psychiatrist, Sharon G. Rechter, M.D. On
remand, the ALJ 1 also sought an independent paper review of Appellant’s records by
another psychiatrist, Richard Cohen, M.D. After another hearing, the ALJ again found
that Appellant failed to qualify for DIB and SSI.

II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Our review is plenary but, as the District Court did, we only review the ALJ’s
decision to deny social security benefits for substantial evidence. Chandler v. Commn’r
of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence requires that the
ALJ’s findings rely on evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir.
2003)).

1

The initial ALJ was Donald T. McDougall. J.E. Sullivan was the ALJ assigned on
remand.
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III. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the ALJ’s decision was not founded on substantial evidence
because the ALJ discredited the opinion of Appellant’s treating physician and was biased
against him.

A. Lack of Deference to the Treating Psychiatrist
While an ALJ must give great weight to a claimant’s treating physician, an ALJ
may discredit the treating physician’s opinion if other evidence contradicts it. Morales v.
Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. Here, it was
appropriate for the ALJ to discredit Rechter’s opinion. It was unsupported by Rechter’s
own medical documentation (which was internally inconsistent), contradicted by other
medical evidence (particularly the July 13, 2009 assessment of P. Iyengar, M.D.), and
undermined by Cohen’s assessment. As the District Court explained, Cohen faulted
Rechter’s evaluation for downplaying Appellant’s alcohol and drug abuse. Further,
Appellant’s own testimony about his daily activities, which included socializing with
friends and hunting, conflicted with Rechter’s assessment that his ability to function was
severely limited.

B. Bias
In determining Appellant’s ability to function, the ALJ pursued a line of questions
that probed Appellant’s love life and sexual relations with female interests. Appellant
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contends that this demonstrated that the ALJ was biased against him and prevented him
from receiving a full and fair hearing because the questions embarrassed him. Such
questions, while of a very personal nature, do not reflect any bias by the ALJ and did not
impede the ALJ’s responsibility to help Appellant develop a full and fair factual record.
See Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902-03 (3d Cir. 1995). If anything, these questions
were part of the ALJ’s legitimate inquiry into Appellant’s ability to interact with other
people, which was salient to the ALJ making a fair and informed decision about his
alleged disability.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the May 16, 2012 order of the District
Court.
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